THE WORLD IS BEING REDRAWN.
Not by diplomats. Not by treaties. Not by the careful language of institutions. It is being redrawn by power, raw, transactional, and unapologetic. The rules-based international order that American hegemony built after 1945 is not merely fraying. It is being actively dismantled. And caught between all of it, geographically, historically, and tragically, sits Somalia.
In January of this year, I sat down with Mukhtar Hussein Mohamed, widely known as Mukhtar Qoransay. A postgraduate-educated strategist who worked in the Norwegian government, served as a senior decision-maker in Somalia's national security architecture under President Farmaajo, and led the national identity institution NIRA. He has never given a media interview. But what he told me shook me to my core.
What he described was not analysis. It was a warning. And events since that conversation — Israel's recognition of Somaliland, Turkey's oil drillship dispatched to Somalia's waters, the collapse of political talks in Mogadishu this very week — have confirmed, with disturbing precision, everything he predicted.
I. THE WORLD THAT MADE SOMALIA VULNERABLE
For three decades after the Soviet collapse, the United States stood as undisputed hegemon — guarantor of international norms, enforcer of borders, architect of multilateral institutions from the IMF to the UN Security Council. This order was imperfect and hypocritical in application, but its architecture was real. It created predictability. It constrained the worst behaviours of powerful states.
That architecture is now collapsing. What political scientists call multipolarity, a world of competing power centres, each pursuing regional dominance, each with its own model, and none bound by shared norms — has arrived. Not as a theory. As operational reality.
This transition has structural consequences for every weak state on earth. When a single hegemon dominates, smaller states can seek shelter under its rules. When multiple great powers compete, smaller states become prizes to be won, proxies to be deployed, and battlegrounds to be contested. This is the historical pattern. It is what happened to Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan.
Somalia is not next. Somalia is already there.
II. THE FIVE FRAGMENTS — AND FIVE DIFFERENT MASTERS
What Mukhtar Qoransay described in January was a Somalia dividing not along lines of clan or ideology, but along the strategic interests of external powers. He mapped five distinct trajectories. Events since that conversation have validated every one of them.
Fragment One: Somaliland — Israel's Strategic Beachhead
December 26, 2025: Israel becomes the first UN member state to formally recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign state.
This did not happen overnight. According to reporting from The Washington Institute, Mossad spent years cultivating high-level relationships in Somaliland, paving the way for diplomatic recognition. On December 26, 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed a joint declaration with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi — making Israel the first UN member state in history to recognise the breakaway republic. The Somaliland Foreign Ministry announced the country's intention to join the Abraham Accords.
The strategic logic is not sentimental. It is geometric. Somaliland sits directly across from Yemen on the Gulf of Aden — the northern approach to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, through which approximately 12-15% of global maritime trade transits annually. Israel has been fighting a war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. A diplomatic — and potentially security — presence in Hargeisa gives Israel what analysts at the Institute for National Security Studies describe as an operational area close to the conflict zone: the ability to monitor Houthi movements, project intelligence assets, and position itself in the Red Sea Basin for the first time since its relations with Eritrea collapsed in 2020.
According to Wikipedia's documentation of the Israel-Somaliland relations page, as early as October 2024, Israel and Somaliland were discussing the possibility of establishing an Israeli military base in Somaliland to counter the Houthis — with the UAE reportedly offering to fund the construction. The recognition is the formalisation of a relationship that has been building for years, beneath the radar of most Somali political observers.
"The Mossad spent years cultivating relationships in Somaliland. By the time the declaration was signed, the strategic architecture was already built."— Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Somalia's government condemned the recognition as an 'unlawful step' and a 'deliberate attack' on its sovereignty. The African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, and 21 mostly Muslim nations condemned the move. The UN Security Council convened an emergency session. But condemnations, however numerous, are not a strategy. And Somalia is currently without one.
Fragment Two: Mogadishu — Turkey's Army, Turkey's Oil, Turkey's Nation
When you look at the Somali National Army today — its trainers, its doctrine, its logistics, its funding — you are looking at a Turkish institution. Camp TURKSOM outside Mogadishu, the largest overseas Turkish military base in the world, has trained an estimated 10,000 Somali soldiers. Turkey delivers attack helicopters, builds hospitals, manages Mogadishu's airport and seaport. When Turkey calls, Mogadishu answers, not by choice, but by the inescapable logic of dependency.
But Mukhtar Qoransay's warning goes deeper than military presence. What he told me — and what has since been confirmed by investigative documents leaked during Turkey's parliamentary proceedings — is that Turkey is not just training Somalia's army. Turkey is drilling for Somalia's oil. And the terms of that arrangement are among the most exploitative resource agreements in modern African history.
In March 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed a major offshore hydrocarbon exploration and production agreement granting Turkey's state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) exclusive rights to explore an area covering roughly 15,000 square kilometres offshore, plus 16,000 square kilometres onshore. Turkey dispatched its research vessel Oruç Reis to Somali waters in October 2024, escorted by Turkish naval frigates, conducting 3D seismic surveys across three offshore blocks. In February 2026, Turkey deployed its seventh-generation deep-sea drillship, the Çağrı Bey, to begin what will be Turkey's first overseas deepwater drilling operation — targeting the Curad-1 well, located 370 kilometres offshore Mogadishu at a depth of 7,500 metres.
Somalia is estimated to hold up to 30 billion barrels of offshore hydrocarbon reserves, according to US government assessments. The Somali Petroleum Agency has described this as among Africa's most significant untapped energy deposits. But what does Somalia actually receive from this arrangement?
▶ Turkey's cost recovery rate: Up to 90% of produced oil/gas recovered before profit-sharing (Article 4.7 of the agreement)
▶ Somalia's royalty: A capped 5% of production revenues — among the lowest in any African resource agreement on record
▶ Upfront payments from Turkey: Zero. No signature bonus, no development bonus, no surface fees — in direct violation of standard industry norms
▶ Turkey's export rights: Unrestricted rights to export its share at international market prices, retaining all revenue abroad
▶ Local company requirement: None. Turkey may assign rights to third parties without establishing a Somali corporate presence
Nordic Monitor, which obtained and published the leaked agreement text, describes the deal's provisions as so deeply favourable to Ankara that they 'deviate from standard industry practices where host governments typically demand substantial initial payments for exploration rights.' Somalia's parliament ratified the broader Defence and Economic Framework Agreement — including the energy provisions — by 213 votes to 3.
"Somalia may receive 5% of its own oil. Turkey keeps 90%. And the Somali national army that would theoretically defend this arrangement is trained, equipped, and operationally dependent on Ankara."— Abdijaliil Osman — analysis based on leaked agreement documents
The critical question is not whether Turkey has exploited Somalia's vulnerability. It has. The critical question is whether Somalia's leadership understood what they were signing and if they did, who sanctioned it.
Fragment Three: Jubaland — Kenya's Buffer State
Jubaland, Somalia's southernmost federal member state, bordering Kenya — has been Nairobi's strategic project for over a decade. Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in 2011, subsequently absorbed into AMISOM, was never simply about defeating Al-Shabaab. It was about creating a manageable border state protecting Kenya's northeastern corridor, securing the Lamu port economic zone, and giving Nairobi enduring leverage over Somali federal politics.
Ahmed Madobe's administration maintains closer operational ties to Nairobi than to Mogadishu in key respects — security coordination, intelligence sharing, economic logistics. As documented by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Jubaland has now formally suspended relations with Mogadishu, joining Puntland in an effective boycott of the federal political process. Kenya's strategic interest in Jubaland is structural, not incidental. It will not diminish regardless of who governs in Villa Somalia.
Fragment Four: Puntland — The UAE's Anonymous Client State
Mukhtar Qoransay began his assessment of Puntland with a phrase that carries more historical weight than any diplomatic communiqué: Puntland used to call itself the mother of the federal government.
This is not nostalgia. It is a fact. When Somalia's federal architecture was being constructed in the early 2000s, it was Puntland, the most stable, most institutionally developed, most functionally autonomous region,that provided the political template for what a federal Somalia could be. Puntland's leaders argued that stability could be built from the ground up, that federal member states with genuine autonomy were the building blocks of a sovereign nation. They were, in many respects, right. Puntland was once Somalia's proof of concept. Now, as Mukhtar put it with deliberate understatement, it is "acting weird."
Puntland today is a semi-autonomous state that has formalised its suspension from Somalia's federal framework, refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the current governing administration in Mogadishu. Its president, Said Abdullahi Deni, widely regarded as one of the UAE's closest political allies in the Horn of Africa, has conducted his own external diplomatic outreach without federal government involvement. And the evidence of why this happened traces directly to a decade-long, systematic construction of UAE dependency.
And according to Mukhtar Qoransay's analysis, Puntland is, in a meaningful structural sense, already dying under Deni’s leadership — not because the Puntland people lack capacity or resources, but because its political elite has made the catastrophic error of believing that asserting independence solves the problem of external predation. It does not. It merely makes Puntland smaller and more vulnerable, without the collective weight of a unified Somalia behind it.
"A Somalia divided into four is not four Somalia. It is four prey animals in a savanna full of lions."— Mukhtar Qoransay, Strategic Analyst
Fragment Five: The Somali Youth — The Only Variable That Changes Everything
This was the fifth trajectory Mukhtar Qoransay described. And it was the only one he spoke about with something other than clinical detachment. He paused. He chose his words with the careful precision of someone who believes, despite everything he has seen from inside the machinery of the Somali state, that there is still a path.
He said: if the Somali youth stand up for this nation, they can save it.
Not as a slogan. As a structural argument. Somalia has one of the youngest populations in the world — the UN Population Fund estimates that over 70% of Somalis are under the age of 30. This is the generation that grew up with smartphones, diaspora connections, and access to global information that their parents' generation never had. They are not bound by the same clan loyalties, the same patronage networks, the same ideological constraints that have paralysed Somalia's older political class.
They are also the generation that stands to lose everything if Somalia fragments. They have no foreign passports as insurance policies. They have no villa in Dubai or London to retreat to when the political winds shift. Their futures are Somalia's futures. And Mukhtar Qoransay's call was directed squarely at them: you are not observers of this crisis. You are, potentially, its solution.
Somalia's diaspora youth — in London, Minneapolis, Toronto, Oslo, Nairobi — have the analytical skills, the international networks, the professional credentials, and increasingly the political consciousness to constitute a genuine counter-elite. The question is whether they will mobilise as a coherent force before the window closes.
III. THE NEW COLD WAR OVER SOMALIA: TURKEY VS. ISRAEL
At the geopolitical centre of Somalia's crisis is a competition that most Somali commentary has failed to name with adequate precision: Turkey and Israel are engaged in a strategic contest for regional dominance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor — and Somalia, including Somaliland, is the primary arena.
Turkey and Israel have a deeply troubled bilateral relationship. Erdogan has been among the most vocal international critics of Israel's conduct in Gaza. Turkey suspended trade with Israel in May 2024. The two countries have recalled ambassadors and maintained sharp rhetorical confrontation. They are not allies. They are, in this region, rivals — competing for the same strategic geography.
The competition maps precisely onto Somalia's fragmentation. Turkey has embedded itself in Mogadishu and Central Somalia through military, economic, and energy infrastructure. Israel has now formalised its presence in Somaliland through diplomatic recognition and the prospect of a security footprint. The two most contested lines of that map run between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, the two capitals of a potentially divided Somalia.
According to analysis published by the Horn Review and the Modern Diplomacy journal, the strategic logic is explicit: Israel's recognition of Somaliland is perceived by Turkey as a 'direct challenge to Turkey's regional influence and an encroachment upon its expanding strategic ambitions' along the Red Sea. Turkey's counterarguments, its opposition to Somaliland recognition, its close coordination with Egypt, Somalia, and Djibouti against Israel's move — represent an active effort to contain Israeli strategic expansion into a geography Turkey considers part of its emerging sphere.
What this means for Somalia on the ground is deeply concerning. Both Turkey and Israel are supplying weapons and military infrastructure to their respective Somali clients. Turkey equips and trains the Somali National Army — effectively Mogadishu's force. Israeli intelligence has been cultivating security relationships in Hargeisa, with reports of military base discussions now formalised under the recognition agreement. Two foreign-patronised armed forces, operating within the borders of a single nation, answering to competing external powers.
"When two competing regional powers are simultaneously arming two parts of the same country, it is not called competition. It is called the precondition for proxy war."— Abdijaliil Osman
Somalia's political class has largely responded to this contest with the tools it knows best: diplomatic statements, emergency summits, condemnation communiqués. These are not irrelevant. But they are profoundly insufficient against actors who are deploying drillships, training armies, and signing security treaties.
IV. WHY THE UAE SUPPORTS ISRAEL — THE CALCULUS BEHIND THE ACCORDS
To understand UAE involvement in Somalia, you must first understand why Abu Dhabi chose to normalise relations with Israel in 2020 — a decision that confounds those who reduce Middle Eastern politics to religious or ethnic solidarity. The UAE's strategic logic is entirely non-sentimental.
The UAE signed the Abraham Accords with Israel in September 2020, brokered by the Trump administration. It was the first Gulf Arab state to formally establish diplomatic relations with Israel since Jordan in 1994. The immediate driver was not ideology — it was Iran. Both the UAE and Israel view Iran as their primary existential security threat. Both benefit from intelligence-sharing, military coordination, and the deterrent signal that a UAE-Israel security relationship sends to Tehran.
But the Iran rationale was only the beginning. What has since emerged between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv is a comprehensive strategic relationship built around three pillars. First, technology and economic diversification: Israel's tech sector — cybersecurity, agricultural technology, water management, defence systems — is among the most advanced in the world, and the UAE's economic diversification strategy away from oil dependence requires exactly these capabilities. Bilateral trade has expanded to billions of dollars annually. Second, defence and arms: since 2022, Israeli defence firm Elbit Systems has signed contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply the UAE's air force with defence systems. A reported deal for Israeli Hermes 900 drones would mark the first major defence-industrial partnership between the two countries. Third, regional strategic alignment: both states share an interest in countering Turkish neo-Ottoman expansion, containing Qatari influence, managing Egypt, and shaping the post-Gaza regional architecture.
As an Israeli Prime Minister reportedly told US Senator Lindsey Graham, and as Graham relayed publicly: UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed 'has done everything asked, and then some.' This is the language of a deep patron-client relationship — one built on shared interests, not shared values.
For Somalia, the implication is direct. The UAE operates in Somalia not as a neutral Gulf benefactor but as a state with specific strategic objectives aligned, in critical respects, with Israeli interests. The reported UAE offer to fund an Israeli military base in Somaliland — if confirmed — would make Abu Dhabi an active facilitator of the very strategic competition that is tearing Somalia apart. And simultaneously, the UAE's covert operations through Bosaso in Puntland, exposed by Somalia's own Defence Minister, suggest Abu Dhabi is playing all sides of Somalia's fragmentation simultaneously.
"The UAE is not a player in Somalia's politics. The UAE is the invisible hand behind multiple players simultaneously. This is not charity. This is strategic architecture."— Strategic assessment
V. ETHIOPIA'S SILENCE — THE MOST DANGEROUS SIGNAL IN THE REGION
When Israel recognised Somaliland on December 26, 2025, the international reaction was immediate, loud, and largely predictable. Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, Somalia — all condemned the move within hours. The African Union issued a statement. The Arab League mobilised. The EU expressed concern. Twenty-one mostly Muslim nations signed a joint condemnation.
Ethiopia said nothing.
Not cautious support. Not diplomatic ambiguity. Official silence. One state minister — Tarekegn Bululta Godana — broke the silence with a careful observation that Israel's recognition was 'a notable diplomatic move that could shape the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa.' The comment was unofficial, but strategic. It was designed to signal to Somaliland that Ethiopia was watching with interest, while maintaining plausible deniability with Mogadishu and Cairo.
To understand what Ethiopia's silence means, you must understand Ethiopia's position. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993. Access to the sea has been the defining strategic obsession of Addis Ababa's foreign policy ever since. In January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding that would grant Ethiopia access to 20 kilometres of Somaliland's coastline for 50 years, in exchange for formal Somaliland recognition. The international backlash — from Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea, and others, forced Ethiopia to pause. But it did not abandon the objective.
Now Israel has done what Ethiopia calculated but hesitated to execute: become the first UN member state to formally recognise Somaliland. The ice has been broken. Ethiopia's strategic calculus has shifted overnight. According to analysis from the Somaliland Chronicle, citing diplomatic sources, Addis Ababa is now exploring what analysts are calling an 'MoU 2.0' — a far more advantageous arrangement with Somaliland that now has enhanced international standing and bargaining power.
Ethiopia's silence is not passive. It is strategic patience, the most dangerous kind. Because when Ethiopia moves, it moves with the weight of Africa's second-most-populous nation, a major regional military force, and an existing de facto relationship with Somaliland that is far more developed than Israel's.
Consider what Ethiopia's formal recognition of Somaliland would mean: an African Union member state endorsing Somaliland's independence. That would shatter the AU's institutional opposition to recognition. It would validate the AU's own 2005 fact-finding mission — which, as the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategically publicised following the recognition, concluded that Somaliland's case is 'historically unique and self-justified in African political history.' It would trigger a cascade that Somalia's government, despite all its diplomatic activity, would struggle to contain.
Ethiopia's silence is not reassurance. It is the sound of a decision being made.
VI. THE MAN IN VILLA SOMALIA — AND THE CRISIS NO ONE IS SOLVING
As all of the above was unfolding — Israel's recognition, Turkey's drillship in Somali waters, Ethiopia's calculated silence, Puntland's deepening separation, Jubaland's alignment with Nairobi — President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was engaged in a domestic political operation that, viewed alongside the external strategic environment, represents a collective elite failure of historic proportions.
The question on the minds of every serious Somali political analyst is this: Is Hassan Sheikh Mohamud preparing to remain in power beyond his constitutionally mandated term, which expires in May 2026? The answer, based on the available evidence, is: yes — and the attempt is already creating the conditions for the next political crisis.
According to WardheerNews, which cited reliable internal sources, President Mohamud recently convened secret meetings with his electoral committee and parliamentary speakers to plan an extension of his government's mandate by two years, beginning May 16, 2026. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, one of the most credible research institutions on African security, published an assessment stating that 'Mohamud's recent attempts to amend the constitution, impose a new electoral system, and redraw the federal map are widely viewed as maneuvers to stay in power beyond the end of his term in May 2026.'
The strategy is familiar to students of African political consolidation. Move toward a 'one person, one vote' electoral model — which in principle is more democratic, but in practice gives the incumbent extraordinary leverage over a process he controls and opponents are not yet organised to counter. Amend constitutional articles that constrain executive power. Neutralise the National Consultative Council by absorbing three of five federal member states into a ruling-party bloc. Use economic isolation — including blocking civilian flights to towns in Jubaland — to pressure holdout federal states. Surround yourself with loyalists and label all opposition as unconstitutional.
The result has been predictable. Puntland and Jubaland, Somalia's two most politically significant federal member states, have suspended relations with Mogadishu. The opposition Somali Future Council — formed in Kismayo in December 2025 — has consistently accused the administration of attempting to centralise power and manipulate the electoral process. And this week, February 18-24, 2026, talks between Villa Somalia and the Somali Future Council collapsed. The government has blamed the opposition for 'unconstitutional demands.' The opposition has accused the government of bad faith. Both are partially right.
The International Crisis Group, in its September 2025 assessment, drew an explicit parallel to the 2021-2022 electoral crisis — which produced street fighting in Mogadishu, delayed elections for over a year, and brought Somalia to the edge of civil conflict. 'Somalia is heading toward the familiar terrain of an electoral dispute,' ICG concluded, 'bringing with it the risk of a fresh flare-up of violence.'
"While Turkey drills for Somalia's oil and Israel redraws its map, Villa Somalia is locked in a crisis over who controls the next election. The nation is burning and the elite is arguing about the keys to the building."— Abdijaliil Osman
Will Hassan Sheikh Mohamud succeed in extending his power? Potentially — in the short term. He controls significant state resources, has aligned three federal member states with his political project, and faces an opposition that the International Crisis Group characterises as having 'tenuous unity at best.' But every day spent on electoral manipulation is a day the external strategic environment deteriorates without a Somali response. Every institution weakened by political interference is an institution that cannot defend Somali sovereignty when it is challenged. The attempt to hold power is directly undermining the capacity to exercise it meaningfully.
VII. WILL SOMALIA SURVIVE? — AN HONEST ASSESSMENT
I am a journalist. My obligation is to accuracy, not to comfort. And the accurate answer to this question is: Somalia will survive, but in what form is the decisive question of this generation.
There are three plausible trajectories.
Trajectory A: Managed Fragmentation (Current Path)
This is the trajectory that most closely matches current dynamics. Somaliland achieves recognition from a critical mass of states, beginning with Israel, potentially followed by Ethiopia, and with others creating a cascade. Puntland formalises its de facto independence, with UAE backing continuing through unofficial channels. Mogadishu retains nominal sovereignty over Central Somalia but its effective authority collapses. The Somali state survives as a legal fiction while the Somali nation fragments into foreign-patronised enclaves — each answering to a different external master.
This outcome is not inevitable. But it is the path of least resistance given current elite behaviour and external pressures. Every day that passes without a coherent Somali strategic response brings it closer.
Trajectory B: Strategic Collapse
The worst-case scenario — and not as remote as optimists would suggest. The Turkey-Israel competition escalates into active proxy conflict within Somalia's territory. The UAE's simultaneous presence in Puntland (through unofficial channels), Mogadishu (through financial relationships), and potentially Somaliland (through Israeli facilitation) creates competing armed loyalties within a single national framework. Al-Shabaab, which launched a major offensive in February 2025 and seized significant territory in central Somalia, exploits the political paralysis. State security forces, trained by multiple competing foreign militaries with incompatible doctrines and competing loyalties, fracture along patronage lines rather than cohering into a national force.
"The danger is not that Somalia disappears. The danger is that Somalia becomes a permanent battlefield — a prize no one wins, and everyone destroys in the attempt."— Abdijaliil Osman
Trajectory C: Strategic Awakening
This trajectory requires Somalia's elite to do something it has shown limited capacity for: think and act as a nation rather than as a collection of competing factional interests. It requires the federal government to develop a coherent external strategy. It requires the diaspora to mobilise intellectual and diplomatic capital. It requires a new generation of Somali strategic thinkers — building the analytical architecture that governance requires.
It requires Somalia's youth to wake up.
It is the hardest trajectory. It is also the only one that leads to sovereignty.
VIII. WHAT MUST BE DONE — A STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR SURVIVAL
One: Somalia must immediately launch a sophisticated international legal and diplomatic campaign against both Israel's recognition and any further cascade. This means engaging every legal mechanism available — the ICJ, the AU, the OIC, bilateral pressure on Israel's major creditors — to establish clearly that recognition carries concrete diplomatic and economic costs. Somalia has legal arguments. The Somali diaspora in New York, London, and Washington has access to international legal and advocacy institutions. What is missing is the institutional machinery to deploy them.
Two: The Turkey energy agreement must be renegotiated or challenged. A resource agreement that grants a foreign state 90% of Somalia's oil revenues and 0% in upfront payments is not a development partnership. It is a resource extraction arrangement of colonial character. Somalia must demand renegotiation, build public awareness of the terms, and place this agreement at the centre of any legitimate accountability conversation about governance.
Three: Somalia's political leadership must be confronted with the existential cost of internal feuding. The collapse of the Mogadishu talks this week is not a minor setback. It is, in the context of everything described in this article, an act of collective self-destruction. Every week spent on term extension manoeuvres is a week the external strategic environment deteriorates without a Somali response. Somali media — and The Abdijaliil Show is part of this responsibility — must make the cost of elite complacency visible and inescapable for the Somali public.
Four: The diaspora must be systematically organised as a strategic asset. Somalia's $2 billion in annual diaspora remittances sustain households. The intellectual capital of the diaspora has not been mobilised for state-building. A formal diaspora strategic advisory architecture could transform this.
Five: Somalia's youth must enter politics — not as supporters of existing factions, but as an independent political force with its own agenda, its own candidates, and its own refusal to accept the terms of the deal the current elite has made with foreign powers at Somalia's expense.
CONCLUSION: A NATION AT THE MOST DANGEROUS CROSSROADS IN ITS HISTORY
I began this investigation with a conversation that changed my life. I end it — in February 2026, with events confirming every warning — with a conviction hardened into certainty:
Somalia is not weak. Somalis are sleeping. And the world's most dangerous players are in the room.
Israel has recognised Somaliland. Turkey is drilling for Somalia's oil under terms that would embarrass a colonial-era concession agreement. Ethiopia is silent — and in geopolitics, the silence of a major power is always strategic. Puntland is being backed by anonymous foreign hands. The Mogadishu political talks have collapsed. And the president may be preparing to extend his own term in the middle of the greatest external threat to Somali sovereignty since independence.
This is the moment Mukhtar Qoransay warned me about. Not a future scenario. Not a theoretical risk. This is the moment.
The Somali youth — in Mogadishu, in Hargeisa, in London and Minneapolis and Oslo — are the variables in this equation that no foreign power has factored into their strategic calculations. They are the one force that the UAE cannot buy, that Turkey cannot train into compliance, that Israel cannot recognise or deny. They are the nation itself.
The question this article poses , and cannot answer, is whether they will act before the window closes.
This article is my attempt to ensure they understand what window they are looking at.
KEY SOURCES & VERIFICATION
Turkey-Somalia Oil Agreement: Nordic Monitor (April 2025, leaked agreement text); OilPrice.com (February 2026); Middle East Eye (December 2025); Ecofin Agency (2025). Israel-Somaliland Recognition: CNN (December 26, 2025); Al Jazeera (December 26, 2025); Times of Israel (December 27, 2025); Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Ethiopia Analysis: Horn Review (December 27, 2025); The Reporter Ethiopia (December 27, 2025); Somaliland Chronicle (December 31, 2025); African Arguments (January 2026). UAE-Israel Relations: International Crisis Group (June 2024); Washington Institute; Middle East Council on Global Affairs (September 2025). Somalia Political Crisis: International Crisis Group (September 2025); Africa Center for Strategic Studies (November 2025); WardheerNews (November 2025); Hiiraan Online (February 2026); Dawan Africa (February 2026). Mogadishu Summit Collapse: Dawan Africa (February 24, 2026); Hiiraan Online (February 24, 2026).
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Abdijaliil Osman is the Founder and Host of The Abdijaliil Show — Somalia's leading podcast with over Half a million subscribers and over three million global listeners monthly. A former BBC producer and award-winning journalist with 10 years of digital media experience.
© 2026 Abdijaliil Show. All rights reserved. For republication rights, contact: abdijalilosman@gmail.com